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ANALYSIS
Corporate Corruption in Russian Regions
By Alena Ledeneva, London, and Stanislav Shekshnia, Fontainebleau
Abstract
To understand corporate corruption in Russia and to develop both effective anti-corruption policies at the 
macro level and anti-corruption strategies at the firm level one has to move beyond the predominant para-
digm and to disaggregate its measurement. This article outlines the results of a pilot survey of CEOs of lead-
ing companies operating in the Russian regions with regard to their use of informal practices.
Informal Practices
Russia finds itself at the bottom of the 22 assessed coun-
tries and one place below China in the Transparency 
International Bribe Payers Index, aimed at measuring 
corporate bribery abroad. It is the TI’s attempt to mea-
sure the perception of corporate corruption rather than 
the perception of public sector corruption reflected in 
the aggregate Corruption Perception Index, which in 
2010 ranked Russia 154 out of 178 countries with an 
absolute score of 2.1 on the low side of the 1 to 10 scale. 
In the words of IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad, the sit-
uation in Russia is “something in a class of its own.” It 
is not that the requisite components of the rule of law 
are absent in Russia; rather, the rule of law has been 
diverted by a powerful set of informal practices that 
have evolved organically in the post-Soviet milieu. John 
Browne, CEO of BP for twelve years, observes in his 
memoirs, “the problem is not the lack of laws, but their 
selective application. This is what creates the sense of 
lawlessness. While bureaucratic legalistic processes are 
the hallmark of Russia, you never know whether some-
one will turn a blind eye or whether the laws will be 
applied to the hilt.” 
Disaggregating Corruption
The global corruption paradigm that has prevailed since 
the 1990s is based on three premises: that corruption 
can be defined; that corruption can be measured; and 
that measurements can be translated into specific pol-
icies. Significant advances in corruption studies and 
anti-corruption policies have been made since then all 
over the world. However, the current paradigm and 
the use of the term “corruption” do not facilitate an 
understanding of the workings of corruption in Rus-
sia for three reasons.
Firstly, corruption is an umbrella term for a vari-
ety of complex phenomena associated with betrayal of 
trust, deception, deliberate subordination of common 
interests to specific interests, secrecy, complicity, mutual 
obligation and camouflage of the corrupt act. In order 
to deal with such diverse practices in an effective way, 
we disaggregate “corruption” into clusters of practices 
relevant for business in Russia.
Secondly, the concept of corruption that underlies 
international regulatory standards presumes completion 
of the transformation from what Weber described as 
“patrimonial power structures,” where decisions made on 
the basis of people’s relationships and traditional forms 
of authority, to rational-legal systems, where institution-
alized rules become the foundation of governance. In 
terms of such transformation, the concept of corruption 
is modern, and the establishment of a rational legal order 
and the institutionalization of rules should become the 
norm, from which corruption is viewed as a deviation. 
The modernization campaign initiated in Russia by Peter 
the Great in the first quarter of the 18th century is one 
example of such a transformation. By undermining and 
subsequently criminalizing the custom of paying tribute 
to officials, he transformed what was an acceptable prac-
tice into the illegal act of bribery. Similarly, the efforts 
of post-communist societies (especially those aspiring 
to the EU membership at the time) to synchronize their 
legislative and institutional frameworks with those of 
advanced market democracies during the 1990s resulted 
in the recognition of practices—regarded for decades as 
commonplace—as corrupt, and in the development of 
sophisticated instruments to eradicate them. However, 
despite legislative and judicial reforms in contemporary 
Russia, sophisticated political and legal institutions have 
not fully replaced patrimonial governance mechanisms, 
which often coexist with modern practices and manip-
ulate them. A classic example here is an elaborate set of 
procedures for the organization of tenders for vendors 
and suppliers. Tenders are formally open and compet-
itive and conducted according to strictly followed pro-
cedures yet also manipulated to the advantage of an 
informally related vendor or a trusted supplier. In soci-
eties where the use of personalized trust compensates 
for defects of impersonal systems of trust resulting from 
selectivity in the workings of formal institutions, it is 
somewhat misleading to apply the term “corruption” as 
it is understood in modern societies.
Thirdly, the majority of contemporary definitions 
of corruption presume that there is a clear distinction 
between public and private realms. Corruption is thus 
understood as “the abuse of public office for private gain.” 
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However, in Russia this distinction is still vague. Key 
actors—government officials of different levels, busi-
ness owners and executives, law enforcement officers, 
employees of private companies and government agen-
cies—brought up with the communist concept of “pub-
lic property” under which all land, capital and other sig-
nificant assets belonged to everyone as a collective owner, 
often struggle to draw the line between the public and 
private domain. In the Soviet days such practices as “tak-
ing home” valuable resources from the office or using 
working time to solve personal problems were common-
place at all levels of society. In the post-Soviet period, 
weak property rights result from the nature of privatiza-
tion: understanding that fortunes are made with support 
of the state and informal channels means their owners 
cannot be fully in possession of their property. As one 
business tycoon acknowledged in an interview to the 
FT, his assets will be given up should the state require 
it. However, the blurred boundary between the public 
and the private for the benefit of the latter runs much 
deeper into the national psyche. For example, between 
the 14th and 18th centuries the so-called “sistema korm-
leniia” (feeding system), under which the tsar gave his 
regional representatives the right to exploit their con-
stituencies for private gain after the state tax has been 
collected, constituted an important element of the gov-
ernance system. Therefore it is not surprising that “inter-
nal corruption,” that is the use of corporate resources or 
authority which comes with the job for personal gain, 
is so common in Russian business. 
Shifting Perspectives on Business 
Corruption
Depending on one’s perspective, informal practices are 
either associated with trust-based relationships, mutual 
obligations and the power of informal norms (bottom 
up); or they are associated with the betrayal of trust by 
agents who bend or break the formal rules set out by 
the principal (top–down). In this context one should 
assume that grassroots forms of corruption are not only 
the outcome of the misuse of corporate office for pri-
vate gain, but also an expression of entitlement associ-
ated with people’s expectations regarding social (in)jus-
tice and compensation for deprivation.
Informal practices can be a response to oppressive 
over-regulation and extortion and thus constitute a form 
of collective whistle-blowing, to be considered as an 
indicator of administrative corruption. In certain con-
texts, top–down anti-corruption campaigns should be 
treated with suspicion, while informal practices should 
be viewed as being justice-driven and as having an equal-
izing effect on the society. In other words, we should 
consider informal practices as indicators pointing to the 
defects in formal procedures and as the key to under-
standing “local knowledge,” as well as to explore their 
relation to “corruption”, rather than simply identifying 
them with the latter. 
By analyzing informal practices as set strategies used 
by firms in Russian regions we propose to complement 
existing approaches to business corruption with a study 
that does not rely on the universal definition of “corrup-
tion.” Rather than following the top–down logic of cor-
ruption indices or governance indicators, it calls for a 
bottom–up perspective and shifts the focus of analysis 
from legal or moral prescription to a relational under-
standing of specific practices as “strategies of coping” 
with the larger system. This has the advantage of cap-
turing a range of practices that are often omitted or 
misinterpreted by the current conceptualization of cor-
ruption, especially the strategies based on the manipula-
tive use of the law and extralegal practices that attempt 
to redress systemic injustice, thereby embodying resis-
tance or mobilization. Such practices are regulated by 
values and incentives that may not be perceived as cor-
rupt by their protagonists, although they nourish cor-
ruption indirectly. 
Business Corruption: Research Findings 
Although the theme of business corruption in Russia 
is being widely discussed both in Russia and abroad, 
there are few comprehensive studies of this phenome-
non. This is understandable, considering its complex-
ity and difficulties encountered in collecting data. To a 
great extent, Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Surveys (BEEPS 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009—
see p. 8) have identified trends in the evolution of cor-
rupt practices. For example, the level of direct extortion 
attempts by organized criminal groups in such coun-
tries as Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus has declined sig-
nificantly since 2000. Government officials at all lev-
els have increased their pressure for economic gains 
and many former mafia figureheads have entered polit-
ical life. Another tendency is that lump sum corruption 
has given way to more sophisticated, legalized forms of 
income such as shares in business and other forms of 
long-term participation.
Although economic corruption in Russian regions is 
part of a much larger phenomenon, eradication of which 
would require systemic changes, business owners and 
managers cannot wait for these changes to take place. 
They have to deal with corruption on a daily basis and 
provide immediate protection for their enterprises and 
stakeholders. We argue that by applying a bottom–up 
approach and by examining specific informal practices 
as “strategies of coping” with the larger system these 
owners and managers can build awareness, which will 
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serve as a foundation for development and implementa-
tion of effective and efficient anti-corruption strategies 
at the company level. Slicing a snake rather than deal-
ing with it as a whole is an imperative for successfully 
managing corruption anywhere, but especially in the 
Russian regions. Applying this paradigm we would like 
to outline a number of important trends taking place in 
Russian regions and to discuss their impact on the anti-
corruption strategies at the firm level. 
In our study we asked CEOs, directors and owners 
of 49 Russian and international companies to describe 
to what extent their businesses are faced with informal 
practices at the regional level. We described informal 
practices in a user-friendly way, with some colloquial 
phrasing. We introduced the questionnaire by stating 
that the listed practices are common and widespread. 
We have also conducted pilot interviews to make sure 
that out list of informal practices is comprehensive and 
covers regional specifics competently and fully. 
We have kept the questionnaire simple and focused 
our questions on the frequency with which informal 
practices are used in regional branches of the firm: sys-
temic use (systematically), occasional use (sometimes), 
not used (never). Questionnaires were completed anon-
ymously, but the firm was characterized by its size, age, 
sector, type of company and number of regions it works 
in. 
Informal practices data are grouped and “tagged” for 
convenience. For example, the practices that have been 
marked as never or rarely used are tagged as “dinosaur” 
practices. These include extorting favors from job can-
didates; leasing company facilities, offices, and equip-
ment for personal income; and paying exorbitant board 
of directors’ fees to cronies. Extorting bribes by the 
regional officials appears also to be on the way out as well. 
“Predator” practices are organized around informal 
cash flow extorted by the state inspection organs from 
businesses. Practices of paying representatives of regional 
inspection and enforcement bodies—fire inspection, tax, 
customs—whether voluntarily or as a result of extortion 
are most systematically used, as well as paying for tax 
inspections with pre-agreed results and for alleviation 
of other forms of state control and regulation. Execu-
tives also note that companies are engaged in support-
ing regional governments’ pet projects and programs—
serving as so-called “relational capital” in the regions. 
Although predator practices are quoted as commonly 
used, other practices associated with “black cash” paid 
outside business domains (prosecutors, courts, police) 
tend to decrease in use with the media being an excep-
tion. “Enveloped” salaries and bonuses paid to compa-
ny’s employees in order to avoid social tax are also on 
the decline. Thus, “traditional” forms of corruption such 
as cash bribes, extortion demands and appropriation of 
assets give way to more subtle practices such as financ-
ing “important” projects, selecting the “right” vendors 
and suppliers, and selling assets to the “right” compa-
nies and at the “right” prices. 
Long-term informal relationships between govern-
ment officials and business executives replace the trans-
actional approach. As one of the business owners inter-
viewed for this article explained: “I am making one of 
my guys the head of strategy in a state-owned company, 
which is a major buyer for my products—not as a head 
of purchasing. I am not interested in signing a contract 
or even a number of contracts. I am interested in shap-
ing the development of this industry for the next 10–20 
years.” The businessman is leveraging his political con-
nections to get this job for his protégé. The informal 
practices become more and more sophisticated to reflect 
the increasing sophistication of the Russian economy 
and its legal and administrative structures. 
“Rat” practices refer to the use of company resources 
for personal gain—one of the most acute problems in 
corporate corruption at a firm level. These include receiv-
ing kickbacks or other informal rewards (for example, 
expensive gifts) by regional managers from vendors, sup-
pliers, buyers and using company funds by heads of 
regional subdivisions to buy expensive cars, telephones, 
to pay for travel . The boundaries between “public” and 
“private” are still blurred in the minds of many manag-
ers and employees of Russian companies, who often use 
corporate resources as an additional source of income. 
The breathtaking stories from the early years of capital-
ism’s development in Russia, in which future oligarchs 
allegedly captured assets worth dozens of billions of dol-
lars thanks to their social ties and special relationships, 
are still popular and make many managers and employ-
ees feel relatively deprived and thus justified in stealing, 
taking kickbacks or selling company assets for personal 
gain. Internal corporate corruption has become a huge 
challenge over the last decade and remains so for Rus-
sian business leaders. In line with the trend of sophis-
tication, business executives no longer make company 
employees build dachas or refurbish apartments, but 
invent complex multi-step schemes to appropriate valu-
able assets. Thus, a group of senior executives from a 
publicly traded company—for which the Russian state 
has a majority stake—managed to consolidate private 
control over more than 30 firms providing them with 
engineering services in the regions. They achieved this 
by forcing their shareholders to sell significant equity 
stakes to “designated” (by the executives) legal entities. 
In negotiating these deals, the managers explained that 
if the vendors agreed, they would retain their contracts 
and would eventually become minority shareholders of 
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a consolidated engineering group worth over a billion 
dollars; if they disagreed, they would lose all their cur-
rent contracts with the company.
“Penguin” practices are associated with those based 
on life-long ties and informal connections that account 
for the blurred boundaries between public and private. 
It is common for an informal relationship to be con-
fused with the use of that relationship in a formal con-
text, for example the use of informal ties and networks 
to secure government orders, contracts and loans from 
state-owned banks. The reverse trend of using company 
employees for personal needs—assisting family mem-
bers, building and repairing houses, arranging trips and 
leisure activities—also occurs. The conflict of interest 
of regional managers, practices of employing relatives, 
hiring affiliated vendors are often based on “penguin” 
affiliations. 
The survey demonstrated that practices using “infor-
mal hooks” are still in circulation, especially those associ-
ated with the use of kompromat and security department 
materials to put pressure on business counterparts, and 
occasionally for the purposes of internal management.
Fighting Corruption
Our study shows that foreign and Russian business 
firms alike implement “formal” anti-corruption strat-
egies, such as court cases, regular audits conducted by 
internal control departments and investigations by secu-
rity departments, development of internal policies and 
procedures, and training for employees and business 
counterparts. However, in Russia, where the governance 
mode carries features of “patrimonial power” and where 
decisions are made on the basis of people’s relationships 
and traditional forms of authority, the balance between 
formal and informal strategies should be adjusted. Fun-
damental changes require a redistribution of “functions’ 
formerly performed by the informal practices in corrupt 
settings. The main reason why it is so difficult to get rid 
of informal practices is because they are also somewhat 
functional for the economy. They perform the functions 
of “shock-absorbers” for the system—always in flux and 
context-bound, they adjust and readjust past-oriented 
informal codes and integrate them with future-oriented 
formal rules. They are functional for solving problems 
posed by defects of the legal system, and they compen-
sate for the imperfections of Russian corporate culture. 
If Russia’s corporate corruption is to be tackled, a 
whole set of essential functions performed by infor-
mal practices need to be dealt with. In other words, 
the problem is not the existence of informal practice 
per se, but their indispensability for supporting busi-
ness’ daily operations, stability of cadres and the status 
quo of the existing system. It is generally assumed that 
as soon as formal rules improve, these practices will be 
rendered ineffective or unnecessary and disappear. It 
might be so, but it takes too long. We believe that simul-
taneous efforts of refining formal procedures and influ-
encing informal practices will make this process faster. 
In the short term, it is essential to consider anti-cor-
ruption improvement in a disaggregated way, starting 
with a bottom–up approach to anti-corruption strate-
gies. Companies can play a proactive and positive role 
in the regions, thus contributing to the overall change 
of business environment. 
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